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reference points and moral aims accepted in the society. There seems to 
be substantial grounds to suppose that the appearance of radical reformers on 
the Russian political stage is a result of traditional and, as always, unjustified 
impatience of the Westernizing wing of the Russian intellectual elite that turned 
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Just in order to really assess the current market reforms in Russia, one cannot 
ignore the cultural premises of its social-economic dynamics. The culture, at that, 
is regarded in the broad sense of the word that could not be boiled down to 
functioning of an industrial branch or system of cultural-leisure institutions. The 
point involves cultural traditions, value reference points and moral aims accepted 
in the society. It is evident that precisely these things exert a considerable effect 
upon human behaviour in the course of the economic activity and, in the end, 
upon functioning of the economy system itself. Mechanical adoption of standards 
and laws that have formed in the cultural environment and other conditions may 
prove ineffective and even dangerous from the standpoint of social stability. With 
no particular risk of exaggeration one may state that the immense social price of 
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A the Russian transformation is mainly due to ignoring the cultural component in 
the design and implementation of social-economic programs. 
Russia still exists in severe conditions of system transformation. And to all 
appearances, the end of the transition will not occur tomorrow or a day after 
tomorrow. Moreover, this is the transition to normality, which did not happen. 
Nevertheless, in spite of all the interruptions and even reverse motions there are 
still chances for a development of the country towards a civil society, pluralistic 
democracy and social market economy. One should be able to learn lessons of 
the recent past and avoid new mistakes. Unfortunately, we have to speak about 
such a danger. But heretofore I’ll try to characterize the intermediate totals of the 
‘Russian transformation’. 
 
What did we want and what do we have ? 
 
One should admit that there is a range of positive totals in respect to the market 
transformation. Their obvious positive aspect relates to the fact that isolation of 
the country from the external world has been overcome, and mechanisms of 
command economics and of foreign trade monopoly have been demounted. As a 
result, humiliating goods and service shortages disappeared, their assortment 
broadened. With the cessation of the ideological war against ‘consumerism’ the 
people’s right to ‘cosiness’ has been restored. What is the most pleasant is that 
the personal initiative formerly constrained is set free now. Business class is 
being formed which is expected to lay basis for the country’s prosperity. 
Population swiftly gets rid of historically acquired dependency complexes. In 
spite of all kinds of predictions Russians quickly adopted a ‘market’ way of 
thought and actions. So typical of the Soviet system, the equalization of personal 
incomes has been eliminated and notable progress of working discipline and 
ethics of labour has become obvious now: it makes sense to raise money since a 
possibility to change it easily to formerly unavailable goods and services has 
appeared.  In conclusion, it is worth to note that after the 70 years of 
fundamentally different economic system the formal institutions of market 
economy, i.e. commercial banks, commodity and stock markets, currency 
exchanges, fundamentally new tax mechanisms, antimonopoly regulations, etc., 
have been created over a sufficiently short period in the country, which started to 
do their work of sorts. Nevertheless the negative results of market 
transformations are more gross and noticeable. They obviously prevail over the 
successful ones. The point is not only that the country has lost half of its 
economic potential. It is worse that processes of production simplification, labour disintellectualization and social area degradation cannot be stopped so far. Here 
one should add an outbreak of mass poverty, which during the years of radical 
changes extended swiftly due to the dissolution of the not very rich by western 
criteria but still the middle class formed in the USSR. Over the period of the 
1990s of the past century, Russia evidently moved away from the desirable 
socio-economic standards of Euro-Atlantic nations and approached the averaged 
characteristics of a typical ‘third world’ country with a great polarization of 
personal incomes. Calculations of all kinds and studies of material possibilities of 
Russian households indicate that in fact not more than a quarter of the country’s 
population utilize the fruits of the reformations carried out, and a half of the 
residents struggle for living even harder than in the soviet time. 
Certainly an effectiveness of the native reforms is influenced by very powerful 
objectives factors, making a system transformation more difficult in Russia, than 
in countries, our ex-partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. 
While in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe a socialistic existence 
lasted for 40 years and in most cases was imposed from the outside, in Russia 
socialism predominated for more than 70 years and was so to speak a 
completely native and not ‘imported’ product. Then one should take into account 
that unlike the CEE countries the Russian reformers had a purpose to continue a 
system transformation against a background of the headlong disintegration of a 
formerly united state that was initiated by themselves. Multiethnic composition of 
the ex-USSR population under democratization of social life sufficiently facilitated 
the realization of nation-economic chauvinism which tends to ignore 
considerations of economic expedience. Whatever intentions of leaders of the 
new independent states were, the reality demonstrated that a break of the united 
economic space did not facilitie but rather aggravated a transition to the market 
economy of every sovereign republic of the ex-USSR, not excepting Russia. And 
finally, with reforms being started it was a military production that appeared to be 
a great burden to the economy reconstruction in Russia. 
Nevertheless, with no risk of exaggeration one may state that the disappointing 
totals of the system transformation in Russia are mainly made by hands and only 
on a second-priority basis predetermined by the special unfavourable starting 
conditions. In any case, an extremely high social price of the reforms has 
become the main reason for the fact that the concepts of democracy, market and 
freedom themselves have been to a great extent discredited in the Russian 
social conscience. 
A  social solidarity loss, a social dissociation are the next sad total of the 
transformation of the Russian society. Among the constituents of the excessive social price which had to be paid for the radical economic reforms in Russia 
there is a neglect of moral and psychological dimensions of a human being. 
Intensive elimination of a moral and ethical component from social existence 
does deform everyday life of man. Demographic studies show that more than 
two thirds of causes of depopulation in Russia are associated with those 
occurring during the post-soviet period social-psychological phenomena: social 
depression, apathy and aggression. Sharp turn of mass conscience towards 
enrichment at any price proved to be a severe psychological trauma for a 
considerable part of the Russian population and a source of both personal 
tragedies and social pathologies of all kinds. 
Representatives of the former middle class who at the moment of the reform 
start were numerous enough (experts with high education, medium-level 
directors, employees, highly skilled workers) had the hardest time. In comparison 
with the other groups of population their living standard has decreased especially 
drastically. 
Beginning with the end of the 1950s in the Soviet Union if not the elements then 
the certain prerequisites for a civil society began to arise, i.e. a wide stratum of 
teaching, engineering and scientific intelligentsia, medium-level management 
personnel, cultural workers have appeared. Special features of many 
representatives of this class were not only a social status, a high level of 
education and a cash income but also an independence of thinking, a high self-
appraisal, ability to resist a political manipulation, self-respect, i.e. all the signs of 
class consciousness which distinguish a middle class from a middle consumer 
stratum. Representatives of this class were particularly noticeable in big 
industrial centres. Russia had at its disposal such locations of scientific and 
technical brainpower as well as of creative intelligentsia as Moscow, Leningrad, 
Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Gorky, Kazan, Tomsk, etc., which put Russia in the 
forefront of the word hierarchy of intellectual countries. 
However, innovative personnel potential was not engaged by the reformers in 
the creation of new Russia. Moreover, especially the representatives of the 
middle class experienced to the utmost the economic and social deprivation in 
the course of the realization of the reforms. Russian reformers tried to get rid of 
this social group as soon as possible. The majority of its representatives were 
thrown away at the wayside of the social life, a lot of them emigrated. Thus one 
of the main factors of a successful transition to a liberal market and a democratic 
state – a creative resource of the population – instead of being involved was 
destroyed to a great extent. Drastic weakening of scientific and technical and human potential is irreplaceable from economic and social point of view, which 
Russia encounters during these 15 years. 
It is important to emphasize such a significant social consequence of Russian 
reforms as a growing gap between the authorities and the people. Alienation of 
the population from the State machinery, which is typical of a totalitarian regime, 
not only didn’t disappear but even became stronger as a result of the 
transformation during the 1990s. Actually the state has turned into a closed all-
sufficient corporation, and a considerable part of the population, in the first place 
public sector employees, wage labourers, pensioners, children and invalids, 
have turned into a burden for the members of this corporation. 
This is the list of main constituents of the social price which is being paid by the 
country for the radical market reforms. And now about their political totals. 
In comparison with other European states, in Russia the liberal ideas traditionally 
had no wide social base. A resort to liberal values is typical only of particular 
periods of the Russian history in 19th-20th centuries. The decade covering the 
second half of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s proved to be exactly the 
period of this kind. It is hardly possible to deny that in the Russian society of that 
time a popularity of ideas of personal liberty and private initiative increased 
headlong. By the beginning of the 1990s, they seized minds of a considerable if 
not the major part of the population, it being the most productive. In short, a wide 
social and psychological base for realizing liberal and democratic ideas occurred. 
As for the state authority, a serious opportunity for the development of 
democratic processes, the formation of the civil society, the creation of civilized 
liberal market economy was given to it. 
But the Russian reformers not only did not take advantage of this unique 
opportunity; actually they used best efforts to defile the values of freedom in the 
public opinion. The situation in Russia of the 1990s caused an increasing 
negative and even hostile attitude towards both values of freedom and a concept 
of democracy itself in the public opinion. It became a synonym for stealing and 
corruption, and a liberal idea was compromised so strongly that already by the 
end of the 1990s a scale of aggressive non-admission of liberal and democratic 
values had created real prerequisites for the recurrence to an authoritarian 
regime. Discredit of democracy and creation of prerequisites to authoritarianism 
is the main social and political result of the Russian reformers’ activity of the 
1990s. Today the society reaps the fruits which it sowed. It is sad to state that 
the present political superstructure logically and irresproachably crowns the 
economic basis created during the years of the reforms. ‘Magic thinking’, or why are they ‘’like that’ ? 
There seem to be substantial grounds to suppose that the appearance of radical 
reformers on the Russian political stage is a result of traditional and, as always, 
unjustified impatience of the Westernizing wing of the Russian intellectual elite 
who, as the fate willed, turned out to be at the helm in the country at the 
beginning of the 1990s. It is important to emphasize this today because at 
present, after a period of the ‘storm and onslaught’ it has become a good form if 
not to demonize the first team of the ‘shock therapists’ then, at least, to renounce 
them. Actually both the intelligentsia and the so-called common people simply 
adored the then young efficient reformers and, to be quite precise, their patron 
the first President of Russia who had promised to shortly ‘make people happy’. It 
is only today rather difficult to find people who voted for Yeltsin and who 
unconditionally supported his young companions-in-arms. In the decisive 1991, 
everything was different. And if the vox populi, vox Dei maxim is right, then they 
could not be reproached at all. The thinking part of the people got caught into a 
trap of a neoliberal utopia, and unfortunately this part of the people played a 
decisive role in forming and spreading new social illusions. 
It seems preposterous to condemn the radical reformers because they 
supposedly started the deregulation of the country’s economy. By 1992, it was 
mostly deregulated in the result of the disastrous for everybody opposition of the 
Russian authorities and the Union’s central authorities. Undoubtedly those 
reformers are right who state that, by the time of their taking the helm in their 
hands, the controllability of the economy; the soviet in general and the Russian 
in particular, had already been practically lost, whereas the commodity-money 
imbalance reached its immense swing. It is true, though, that they will have to 
admit that the country owned both these points mainly to their patron and to 
themselves. 
To my mind, it is incorrect albeit quite widely spread in the society the 
indiscriminate criticism of the so-called shock therapy implying, in general 
opinion, the single-step price liberalization that occurred on the 2nd of January, 
1992. For the market economy adepts, there should be no doubt in principle that 
most prices had to be liberated otherwise no mechanism of market self-
regulation could be triggered. True, one could argue about the set-liberated price 
ratio under the then Russian conditions. But that would be an object for a 
separate talk. Be that as it way, reproaching the reformers for ignoring the 
monopolistic nature of the soviet economy would be unsound. Many people even 
now believe that first a competitive environment should have been formed and only after its formation one could start the liberalization of prices. Such an idea is 
utopian through and through as it is in principle impossible to create competitive 
relations with the set prices. 
As for the not alleged but real mistakes of the ‘dramatis personae and 
performers” of the Russian reforms, it seems that so much has already been said 
and written than it would be difficult to add anything new. Still, a specific attention 
should be attracted to the world-outlook nature of miscalculations and omissions 
in the reform policy as well as in the economic policy in general. Unfortunately, 
this issue still has not lost its urgency. 
I will begin with obvious inclination of both yesterday’s and today’s reformers 
towards the ‘magic thinking’ implying a mixture of failed hopes and widely spread 
wrong beliefs, illusions and myths. Among the illusions, I would emphasize first 
of all assuming current world-outlook imperatives of the West as a guide, the 
imperatives justifying the pursuit of its economic and social standards as well as 
the absolutization of the so called universal economic regularities disregarding 
the requirements of the ‘place and time’. Here also belongs the conviction of the 
necessity of maximally high velocity of the changes as a decisive factor of their 
irreversibility with which the reformers used to explain their apprehensions of the 
communist revenge. In addition, the illusion pool should include a naively 
favourable attitude towards the ways in modern world economy where only 
friendly and mutually understanding relations seemingly reign. From the very 
beginning of the radical reforms, the following thesis was considered infallible: 
the rapid openness of the Russian economy is beneficial whereas a gradual and 
dosed one is harmful. 
And now to the myths. First, there is a firm idea implying well-being of those 
world nations who succeeded in boiling the state participation in economy down 
to a minimum. The point is the anti-etatist syndrome penetrating the ‘main bed’ of 
modern economic through but having almost nothing to do with the reality. 
Secondly, one should include here the creation of unconditioned regularity of the 
thesis of organic weakness of a state in the ‘transitory’ countries and in Russia in 
particular. This thesis implies that here the interference of the state in the 
economy life must be even more limited than in mature market economies. And 
thirdly, in the end, the adherence of reformers to the theory of a ‘burden’ should 
be regarded as a myth, the theory implying that Russia will sooner join the 
flowering West’s bosom without the burden of the past: the weak satellites in the 
persons of the post-soviet republics. And somehow an idea prevailed that the 
new sovereign states, the former USSR republics, will not be able to survive 
without the new Russia. Here, a kind of objection surfaces that all this is the past, that in the post-default 
Russia the economic policy has lost its strictly ideological trend and acquired an 
exclusively pragmatic character. It would be desirable, of course, but something 
impedes thinking so. 
It is difficult to get rid of the sensation that the economic philosophy underlying 
the concrete policy has not changed up till now as compared with the beginning 
of the 1990s. The tendency towards the denationalization of economy goes on 
along all the lines even though powerful holdings are being created, but they are 
a topic of a separate discussion. The attempts to ‘market’ the whole Russian life 
are going on in spite of seemingly richest and sad experience of the ‘limitless 
liberalism’ that should long ago have become a source of some useful lessons. 
With the persistence worthy of a better use … 
In compliance with the idea still existing here and in the West, the neoliberal plan 
of transforming the command economy into the market one created in the 
beginning of 1990s has failed in Russia just because various ‘unexpected’ 
circumstances interfered with it, although the plan itself was irreproachable. The 
various circumstances mean ‘bad’ communists who always strive for revenge, 
the populist leftist Parliament and, finally, the inert population that had been 
brought up in paternalism and that has not yet lost the hope to survive after the 
accomplished reforms. 
It is worth noticing that even after the events of 1998 the official statistics by the 
International Monetary Fund on the reasons of the failure of the Russian reforms 
remained unaltered. The IMF Management unwillingly admitted some errors in 
their advice given to the Russian reformers: for instance, the consent for the 
fixed ‘currency corridor’ is considered to be an error. In general, however, ‘if the 
Russians (here I almost literally cite Fischer, Smith and Camdessus) had fully 
followed the recommendation that they had worked out themselves albeit with 
our aid, then the reforms would have been successful’. And these 
recommendations are well known to be quite simple: the maximal privatization, 
the minimal level of inflation, the maximal openness for the outside world, and 
the minimum of the state interventionism. 
Now everything indicates that a new wave of essentially cannibal liberalism is 
rolling on. Particularly the aiming of the economy authorities at further reduction 
of the budget expenses in social sector is obvious, the expenses having dropped 
as it is to the level inadmissible for our country. In 1990, there still existed some 
illusions of a spontaneous increment of off-budget support for social sphere branches, some naïve hopes that a part of the budget burden would be grasped 
by the newly-made private economic organizations. But now it is quite clear that 
there exists a strategic tendency towards the reduction of the number of 
organizations whose activity demands – and I emphasize this – uninterrupted 
state financing. The objective character of unoprofitability of the social sphere of 
most organizations at any degree of maturity of the market economy is 
absolutely being ignored. Just from the facts of inherent unprofitability of this 
sphere, ensue the constitution guarantees and the budget responsibilities of a 
modern state for a systematic support of institutions of healthcare, fundamental 
science, culture and education. I would note here that such a support is realized 
on the regular basis in all mature market economies and in relatively successful 
post-socialist countries. 
But our government does not wish to do this because of ideological but mostly 
because of fiscal reasons, and it seems to try to get rid of constitutional 
guarantees of the ‘social’ state (isn’t it a mockery over the written Constitution ?) 
and to switch over to contract relations that in their nature are transitory. The 
result of such policy is more or less obvious and will not make one to wait too 
long: the degradation of the social sphere will headily move its collapse near, 
while the intentions to built a knowledge-based economy will remain just starry-
eyed dreams. 
Generally speaking, we all must take into consideration the one curious global 
intellectual phenomenon of today’s. I mean the immense influence if not the total 
‘terror’ of the main component of the basic bed of modern economy thought. And 
the content of this component in brief can be boiled down to the maxim as 
follows: ‘state’s mistakes are always worse than those of the market’. Hence, it 
seems better to ‘overado’ with the deregulation than with excessive spreading of 
state’s interventions comprising their unavoidable bureaucratic perversions. At 
the same time, a huge gap exists between the ideological component and the 
real practice of the very ‘market-oriented’ western countries. It suffices to say 
that now through the total state budget of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development, i.e. the richest states of the World, half of the 
gross domestic product will be distributed, while one hundred years ago this 
parameter did not exceed 10 percent. It is appropriate to note that one hundred 
years ago there existed no middle class, and that it appeared in the second half 
of the last century, i.e. just when the state’s participation in the society economic 
life reached its apogee both in quantitative and in qualitative aspect. 
It is quite obvious that the ‘demonization’ of state as such that started about 25 
years ago is associated exclusively with the ‘over-socialization’ of mature market economies, i.e. with a certain hypertrophy of the state’s social functions. 
Nonetheless, limitation of the state interventionism there, mostly imaginary or at 
best insignificant, should be regarded as just a correction of the ‘general 
prosperity State’ and not as its dismantling. 
But it seems that our reformers are interested in a made-up life rather than in the 
real life of the ‘reference’ countries. They must have ideologically pure regimes 
of free market where the State is reduced to the role of a ‘night watchman’ of the 
18th century. It seems that for them any activity of the State is vicious except the 
provision of ‘the unity of the game rules for all’ and the compulsion to follow 
them. True, this quite easily combines with lamentations apropos of a ‘weak’ 
State and the wish to enforce the power authoritarianism. In brief, here in Russia 
the anti-etatist rhetoric is not just rhetoric. It is still a guide to action. And I see 
great danger in this. 
The above said does not mean that the social policy demands no renovation. But 
is should be based on a different in principle world outlook idea in compliance 
with which just the development of the social sphere in its broadest sense 
predetermines the prospects of a stable economy growth and not the contrary as 
is assumed today by the federal and regional elites. When optimizing the social 
policy the development of its parameters will decidedly have to refuse to 
acknowledge a widely spread opinion that expenditures for social purpose are 
always a deduction from the national wealth and an obstacle for economy 
growth. 
Experience of the West and successful post-socialist countries quite certainly 
confirms the truth of this thesis: correctly built priorities and the institutes of social 
policy do not interfere with economic activity at all and, on the contrary, do 
stimulate it simultaneously providing the necessary political support for the 
reforms. So, banal as it might sound, the main requirement of today is this: stop 
destroying the human potential and create the conditions for its revival and full 
development meaning the qualification-educational characteristics of man, 
his/her cultural level, real access to efficient healthcare and well-deserved social 
security. 
Science has its significance 
As far as I know, nowhere in the world do liberals or interventionists doubt the 
above noted and lasting during the whole 20th century tendency of advancing 
enlargement of the State’s participation in economy of any social medium. Of 
course, there are differences from one country to another: somewhere the state quota, i.e. national budget against gross domestic product ratio, is greater, 
somewhere it is less. But the fact of its growth during the most part of the last 
century is unarguable in the world scientific community. The arguments start 
when interpreting the fact itself of the ‘effuse’ State. Some believe that it is bad, 
others think it is good, the third parties – and I rank myself among them – urge to 
regard the systematic State activity as some objective regularity, meaning that 
here its certain ebbs and flows are also regular. 
Here I would like to consider in more detail the issue of the role of economic 
science in social-economic development in general, and the theoretical 
knowledge against practical policy ratio, in particular. It is only at the first and 
superficial glance that the academic arguments seem to be unrelated to concrete 
economy policy. Whereas in fact the practicing politicians, their advisors and 
consultants in their activity and recommendations always follow willy-nilly a more 
or less integral theoretical construction. It exerts a powerful effect upon the made 
decisions that, depending on their content and perception, can be benevolent or 
not quite so. 
Today it has become particularly evident that a keenness on incorrectly 
understood concept of economic freedom may give rise to effects absolutely 
opposite to the expected those and, in this way, to seriously interfere in 
invigoration of the situation in the country. 
Now if, say, to proceed from correctness of assumption that ‘the less of the State 
the better for the economy’ or, as Mises wrote, any state activity is an evil 
imposed by some people on ‘the right’ or ‘not right’ state interventions.’ In other 
words, once they are all harmful in principle, one should simply get rid of them. I 
think that it is not by chance that in Russia there are great problems with more or 
less consolidated influential force capable of revealing and implementing the 
society’s interests. 
The category ‘social interest’ itself turned out to be rather discredited which is, of 
course, quite understandable. It is difficult to expect something else after so long 
an oppression of the individual by the state under the conditions of the 
communist dictatorship. But to understand does not mean to accept. It was quite 
unnecessary to splash out a child along with dirty water. And it happened just so. 
And in the result, the place of hypocritical ‘do first think of the fatherland and only 
then of ‘yourself’ has become occupied by no less hypocritical ‘the egoism of 
each one is a good for everybody’. And it is quite unknown, at that, what 
precisely prevails in this latter formula: striving for unbridled freedom in 
compliance with purely world outlook motives or forced devotion to it by reason of seemingly regular weakness of regime under conditions of the radical system 
transformation. 
In general, it seems to me that unproportionally great influence of the radical 
liberalism in ‘servicing’ a concrete economic policy of Russia today is primarily 
associated with obsolete and therefore obviously inadequate understanding of 
modern mainstream in the economic theory. Considering the whole thing, the 
phase of simplified liberalism is either completed or draws to exhaustion. The 
newest theoretical views of macroeconomics character in the West and in the 
East unequivocally admit the presence of some specific social interest that is far 
from always considering only the interests of private economic subjects. In this 
connection, participation of the state in modern economy is subject to a new 
interpretation. It does not any longer interfere with the social medium economic 
life but acts there as an equal in rights market player striving to realize this social 
interest. And once the state becomes a market player, its activity should be 
subject to the rules of rational behaviour. In other words, at every given moment 
maximization of one or another social interest is reached with strictly limited 
resources. Hence a new and broader view of the market balance formation 
implying inclusion of the state into the group of independent market subjects, the 
state striving to maximize its own function of social usefulness. All this composes 
a certain integrated concept, which we (together with Professor A.Ya. 
Rubinstein) are presenting in a recently published book The Economic 
Sociodynamics. 
Be as it might, if the social interest is perceived just as a sum total of personal 
interests and in no other way, the state with its various economy activity must 
unavoidably be pushed aside of the social structure. But the devil is known to 
hide in details. And some of them particularly brightly light the difference 
between the liberal-pragmatic and liberal-ideological approaches to the 
economic policy. I will try to indicate briefly what I mean. 
Damnation or grace ? 
During these last years, a golden rain of oil dollars poured all over Russia, which 
evoked among the influential ‘pure’ liberals if not panic then, at least, something 
like it. What a lot has been heard of this ! The impetuous increase of the export 
income seems to lead to the conservation of the existing structure of the 
management and to the acceleration of inflation, to the paralysis of people’s 
creative energy, and so on, and so forth. An impression occurred that, with these 
high oil and other fuel and raw material prices, it would be better to import all this rather than to export. In general, a thought was inculcated that ‘money is evil’, or 
something quite surrealistic like ‘the income will soon stop because it is too large 
now’. From the standpoint of common sense, such ‘unluckiness’ is difficult to 
understand. It seems certain that there are so many unsolved problems and 
spheres in the country that it could be not too difficult to spend usefully the 
‘windfall profit’ as the Anglo-Saxons say. Take just the reduction of an immense 
foreign debt, the renovation of the worn down to the limit city infrastructure, the 
construction of the borders with new independent states, let alone the 
governmental expenditures for some investment needs or for restoration of the 
social sector of the economy. 
But no such luck. For the doctrinaire liberalism all this has no sense. And the 
matter is not that its adherents wrongly assess the consequences of the sudden 
improvement of balance of payment: inflation and the growth of real national 
currency exchange rate fraught with increase of the import and decrease of the 
export. Maybe even some grounds could be found (true, I do not see them) for 
discussing a danger of the notorious ‘Dutch’ disease. But we, however, endure 
such problems not for the first time. The world has long since encountered them 
and now uses a certain very reliable set of instruments for their solution. In all 
that, I somehow do not remember that anyone anywhere endured as strongly as 
we do the powerful inflow of freely convertible currency. In the rational and not 
ideological approach to the business, they rather enjoy it without forgetting to 
seize the super-income from economic subjects and direct them to various social 
needs. I will only refer here to the experience of Great Britain and Norway well-
known to me. Whereas we, to all appearances, miss such an opportunity, and 
quite knowingly, too. Because the doctrinaire liberalism proceeds a priori from 
the statement that individuals will always spend money more effectively than the 
‘bureaucratic’ state. 
 
What is ahead ? 
To all appearances, both the President and the Government are aware that in 
fact Russia has encountered a dilemma: whether it will remain mainly the 
exporter of fuel and raw materials, or it will be able to occupy a worthy place in 
the post-industrial global economy. From high places, they constantly speak of 
that in the last years when the country’s dependence on the energy carriers and 
raw materials export has reached the critical level, and has now become a threat 
to its national security. It is also being stated that, while not decreasing the volume of the raw material supply, it is necessary to change the structure of 
Russian industrial production and export constantly, year after year, towards 
complete product and, in the first place, the science-intensive product. But what 
means are supposed to be used for realizing this purpose ? 
Within the group of persons responsible for the economic bloc in the 
Government, it is still assumed that modernizing the Russian economy will occur 
by itself, as a result of the activation of some market self-regulation forces. And 
in order not to hinder these forces the Government will focus its attention at 
completion of forming the law adequate to a civilized market economy, and take 
steps for the suppression of the so called informal, illegal economic relations 
and, consequently, for the creation of conditions for equal application of legal 
standards to all physical and juridical persons. In this connection, they quite 
justly speak of increasing the efficacy of the antimonopoly regulation, of loyalty in 
respect to private property and the contract rights, and of a considerable 
limitation of the ‘economy of advantages and privileges’ formed in the 1990s. 
Finally, it is envisaged to make a special emphasis on the measures for reducing 
the fax burden of investors combined with a course towards successive 
individualization and privatization of the social sphere (the so called structural 
reforms). 
If the concrete policy will limit itself to just these tasks, and they are quite 
sensible except the antisocial tendency of the ‘social’ policy, and if one believes 
that, apart from dramatic increase of the oil world prices, the factors independent 
of these unexpected stimuli will contribute to the long-awaited economic growth 
of the country, it is hardly expectable to change radically the social-economic 
situation in the country. The Russian economy will henceforth be structurized in 
a purely spontaneous way, too; first, because of the interests of transnational 
corporations, and second, if, of course, the openness of the economy 
unexampled by its degree holds out. 
The spontaneity of the formation of the economic structure in Russia in principle 
has no restraints as, contrary to the Central-East European countries, there is no 
threat of accepting the institutional standards of the European Union even 
because, if nothing else, it will not be the Union member even in a long-term 
prospect. One should understand that Russian economy just as economy of 
other states of the post-soviet territory becomes an object of other, more 
powerful economic players with no changes whatsoever of the EC institutional-
legal skeleton here. The tendency of loosing subjectness and, consequently, a 
primitivization of the Russian economy under such conditions becomes 
irreversible irrespective whether the breakthrough in following laws and in stabilization of conditions for business management succeeds or not. Even if the 
positive economic dynamics holds on, the principal contribution to the dynamics 
will be made by the energy-raw material branches of industry possessing the 
export potential, while a considerable portion of the manufacturing industry will 
loose every prospect for a development. 
There is still an alternative to the above variant of the event development, the 
alternative involving the activization of existing scientific-industrial potential for 
achieving and support of acceptable international level of competitiveness for 
selected branches and sectors of the Russian economics. But this alternative 
cannot be implemented spontaneously, without respective rational behaviour of 
the State. And this implies development and conduction of respective structural 
and innovation policy on behalf of the State. Incidentally, then only a chance will 
appear for deliberate structuring of the post-soviet territory or, at the least, its 
major portion. And only then will here our own competitive transnational 
corporations start to arise , the corporations capable of taking part in the 
globalization of the world economy as the subjects and not the objects of the 
process. 
 
Avoiding the other extreme! 
Under today’s Russian conditions, one has to take the other extreme into 
consideration: a very probable growth of the state expansionism threatening to 
replace the boundless liberalism of the 1990s. 
And there really exists such a danger, as in the Russian social medium an idea 
to initiate implementation of some majestic mobilization programme is ripening, 
the programme seemingly able to bring back the status of great power to the 
country. I must note that I rather doubt the wish of our people to start 
implementation of this majestic mobilization programme, noble as might be the 
goal of this programme. So the next attempt of “coercion of the people to 
happiness” will most likely fail. 
Of course, in today’s Russian society nostalgic feelings are widely spread as well 
as total irritation associated with the deplorable results of the reforms and the 
disintegration of great power. But this is a revenge rather for our own illusions 
and euphoria of the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s. Then “the 
people and the party were united” as has already been noted. The country 
wanted first of all not the bread but freedom, while the bread was to be added 
automatically, kind of by itself. They though that the advantages of the socialist conduct would be added up with amenities of market and democracy, and we all 
of us will quickly accommodate ourselves at the sunny side of life where the so 
called “golden billion” is already dwelling. 
The occurring today disappointment in the ideals of market and democracy (let 
us hope, a temporary one) does not necessarily mean that the society 
experiences a yearning for revenge or a collective willingness to get involved in 
the construction of something majestic. Rather one should agree with those 
sociologists who state that mastering individualist values by the Russians has 
already taken place. True, it is not related to the development of the awareness 
in the spirit of the Protestant ethics but, rather, to so to say atomization of the 
social medium or, to say simpler, to the disconnection of the people mostly busy 
with plain survival. 
As far as I know, implementation of all great “teleological” state-oriented projects 
in Russia, irrespective of whether they were utopian or realizable, were 
accompanied as a rule by the horrifying suppression of personal freedom. And 
on the contrary, as soon as a personal initiative got free and man obtained the 
right of choice, the state started to lose headily its majesty and sometimes even 
its sovereignty. It is far from necessary than even today we encounter the same 
fatal dilemma. History does not have the subjunctive mood but there always are 
some alternatives. Practical conclusion from the above said is obvious for 
Russia: to strengthen the state without sacrificing democratic values. It sounds 
almost as banality. But, as Friederich Nietzsche aptly said, “we pay most dearly 
for neglecting the banalities”. I will only add that we pay as dearly for the unlearn 
lessons. 
Through the prism of culture 
The future of Russia is associated with the innovation economy, with the 
necessity of the soonest transition to the “innovation socially-oriented type of 
development” (in terms of the Conception-2020). Close attention, at that, is 
attracted to the exclusively foreground development of science and education. 
However, the quality of human potential as a driving force of the innovation 
economy depends not only on the level of education, experience and 
professionalism, but also on spirituality and mentality of man, his or her 
psychological and behavioural characteristics which was always the 
responsibility of culture. Culture forms the spiritual-moral orientation of the 
personality development, and in the innovation economy not only the personal 
but also the social responsibility of man dramatically increases, the man being a generator of new knowledge. The principle “do not harm” must be laid in the 
basis of the processes of production and translation of new knowledge and 
information, as well as implementation of innovations in the reproductive sphere. 
The reality, however, demonstrates absence of demand for culture including that 
within the system of social life management. Culture did not into the list of the 
foreground national projects. The first mentioning of culture only appeared in the 
Russian President’s Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation in 2007. On the one hand, in words, culture occupies the position of 
the most important resource of the development, on other hand, expenses for 
culture are still an unprotected budget article, while under conditions of taking the 
anti-crisis measures just this particular part of the budget expenses got one of 
the first into the category of those subject to sequestering. 
Meanwhile, settlement of many problems of social life management solution of 
which with the traditional techniques reached a deadlock is in principle possible 
only in the cultural aspect. So that, in the light of culture, there appears another 
principal algorithm of solving the problem of national security as well as that of 
bureaucracy and corruption with which the whole authority vertical is filled. 
Traditionally the solution of the national security problem is associated with the 
military presence, the strength of the armament units, the force control, etc. The 
reality, however, is such that external and internal threats go beyond the limits of 
purely economic or political confrontations oftener occurring because of the 
value contradictions, which directly concerns the human socio-cultural medium. 
Xenophobia, nationalism, chauvinism, religious separatism – they all are the 
links of a single chain the overcoming of which requires “re-forging the swords 
into ploughshares” as violence only gives rise to violence. People are separated 
with just external formalism, whereas culture in its true sense contains the 
largest possibilities of uniting people brought up in different cultural milieu, of 
smoothing up contradictions among the people on the basis of consistent values 
of life, aspiration towards the future, and healthy optimism. 
At present in Russia the most dangerous internal threats which undermine the 
State system foundations internally are bureaucracy and corruption. Solving the 
problem of the bureaucratization of the whole administration system through a 
prism of culture rests upon a spiritual basis of labour. This is not an employment 
status and getting a job at any price for wages, not an occupation of a “field 
position”, this is a creative realization of an individual, a profession chosen by the 
dictates of hearth in compliance with one’s possibilities and abilities. Labour as a value, but not as a doom. This approach to the concept of labour will 
allow avoiding any illusion of activity, repeated duplication of functions and 
documents circulation difficulties, as well as the process of approval procedures 
in all areas of social life. 
Solution of the bureaucratization problem will logically entail a solution of the 
corruption problem. In the light of culture an elimination of corruption needs not 
for a punishment and other coercive actions or prohibitive measures, but rather 
for such a value as confidence having been lost in the society at present. After 
all, opinion polls register terrible evidence: to the question whether “it is possible 
to trust people on the whole or one should be on the alert dealing with other 
people” only one quarter of the interviewed answered positively. To the question 
“during last year what kind of feelings have become apparent and grown 
stronger in folks surrounding you” 25 percent of the interviewed noted tiredness 
and indifference, 5 percent fear, 10 percent perplexity and 14 percent 
exasperations and aggressiveness. Is it possible “to transit to an innovative and 
social-orientated type of development” having such an attitude to life, to 
ourselves and to other people? Extirpation of the corruption will only be possible 
when socio-cultural mechanism eliminating causes of its occurrence are applied. 
Among internal threats it is appropriate to mention here a high mortality rate 
which leaves a birth rate far behind. In addition, deaths from cardiovascular 
diseases, suicide, alcoholism, drug addiction, aggravation of mental disorders 
and as a result of increase in crime are an essential part of the present Russian 
reality. Medical approach or enforcement measures as the ways for solutions of 
these problems are just a top of an iceberg, a fight with the results, but not with 
the causes. The reason is the same: ignoring a crucial role of culture as a 
moving force of personal and social self-regulation, and spiritual ill-being of the 
Russian society. 
In what manner should one apply socio-cultural mechanisms able to resist 
destructive processes in the society? The only right solution to the problem lies 
in the vital necessity of cultural enlightenment not only to keep broad layers of 
population informed with cultural values (that is, undoubtedly, of independent 
significance), but rather to prevent the dehumanization of the society and the 
neutralization of spirituality in people’s life. Here one cannot do without the 
development of a supranational idea (being a multinational and multiconfessional 
state Russia cannot afford a development of a national idea on the basis of 
cultural values of a title nation). There is not doubt that during the Soviet period 
the notion of ideology has discredited itself by its close connection with Marxist-
Leninist propaganda. But, for example, in the 1960s of the 20th century in Japan within the realization of the cultural state concept this process was called “a 
production of values”. It is obvious that the consistent value of life such as a 
family and childhood should be assumed as a basis for supranational idea. The 
main reference point of the cultural enlightenment should be children, rising 
generation because the country future in many respects depends upon the 
system of values, which is accepted as a basis of their upbringing and education. 
It is possible and necessary to create this future just now (not to say yesterday) 
by means of cultural enlightenment of children and adolescents. 
A great responsibility for the actualization and intensification of cultural 
enlightenment is lied upon the intelligentsia. Unfortunately, in present Russia the 
concept of elite is discredited by its associations with the world of luxury, money, 
glamour and etc. In an undistorted reality a consistent attribute of elite is an 
orientation toward high standards of human behaviour and his/her style of life. 
Therefore, the strengthening of the prestige and influence of scientists, 
educators, cultural workers (creators in the real sense in the word), significance 
of an intellectual labour in the society, including the revival of the public lectures 
system, made with the help of the whole Internet arsenal available and new IT 
will make it possible to trigger the cultural enlightenment mechanisms. 
It should be noted that the present Russian society is divided into two parts, the 
line of demarcation being established in the ideological sphere. On one side of 
the scales there are millions of people deeply rooted in the Soviet past with its 
anti-personality social attitude, when a collective had suppressed an individual 
and the state had suppressed the society, on the other, millions of people of 
middle age and the young, brought up by the bold time of the 1990s, when 
individualism as a moving force of the market economy ran the show. The matter 
concerns not a contradiction in a world vision attitude of fathers and children 
(which is an absolutely normal and natural process, by the way) but a gap in an 
intergenerational continuity. Solidarity of the society, overcoming its drastic 
polarization in the direction of synthesis, a reasonable combination of personal 
and social features in a human being is only possible through cultural 
enlightenment. 
Moreover, an ideological gap of intergenerational continuity has given birth to a 
collapse of information transfer system itself, as a ‘teacher-pupil’ connection has 
been mostly destroyed; this relates not only to the fields of education and 
science but to the Whole system of experience transfer from one generation to 
another. This is fraught with attempts to ‘reinvent a bicycle’ instead of inserting 
new knowledge into the structure of spiritual and mental accumulations aiming to accelerate a process of introduction of innovations into the reproductive sphere 
and to modify a human potential of the society as a whole. 
In the light of culture a problem of gender relations towards a greater inclusion of 
women in the system of important state decisions-making is seen differently. 
While in the countries with an advanced market economy there is a trend 
towards an empowerment of women in all fields of social life which is observed 
during the last decades, in Russia there is still an unofficial prohibition of 
participation of women in an administration power vertical. The theme of 
empowerment of women does not cover such extremes as the emancipation and 
feminism when a woman opposes herself to a man and takes upon herself 
unusual functions, but it concerns only an expediency of lawmaking initiatives 
passing through a prism of a mother consciousness as a keystone of a 
successful realization of the police of rational existence. 
While at the turn of the 20th-21st cc. there was a necessity of a social imperative 
of a socioeconomic development, at the end of the first decade of the 21st c. one 
should think about a cultural imperative which constitutes a core of the policy of a 
rational existence. As A.S. Pushkin through one of his characters said: ‘…the 
best and the strongest changes are those which originate from improving of 
morals without any enforcement shocks’. 
 